Introduction The relationship between plagiarism and art can be said to date back to the Roman Empire in 300 B.C, wherein the Roman elites were fascinated by the wealth and culture of Greek cities and demanded works of art which had semblance to Greek culture[1]. To match this demand Greek and Roman artists started making plaster moulds of famous Greek statues filling them with bronze and shipping them to Roman cities where they could be replicated in marble[2]. In the years that followed, things such as relics and artifacts also fell prey to the malpractice of forgery and plagiarism which lead to an increase in the rigour of authentication that was carried out to test the veracity of such art works[3]. In recent times however, the quality of these forged artworks has become so good that at times even esteemed auction houses such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s were unable to identify the real from the fake. One of such incidents took place in the 2000’s when both the auction houses received the same painting, Paul Gaugin’s Vase de Fleurs[4], an expert was later employed who was able to identify the real Gaugin from the forgery. In fact, now after an increase of such incidents Sotheby’s have hired an in-house art forgery expert who scrutinises the paintings before they are listed for auction[5]. Another important example with respect to plagiarism and paintings is the Mona Lisa, which has at least a dozen well-made copies and only the one which is displayed at the Louvre is quoted to be the original one[6]. Moreover, while the original Mona Lisa is actually valued at $834 million, a first-rate copy of the Mona Lisa was recently sold at an auction for $3.4 million[7]. The above quoted examples highlight two very crucial points, the first being that forgery in the world of art has been a common a practice but when it comes to physical art esteemed auctioneer’s like Sotheby’s have set up an internal mechanism to combat this malpractice[8]. The second point being that the monumental disparity in prices of the fake and the real Mona Lisa highlights the importance of ‘authenticity’ in the evaluation of art. A duo of researchers at Yale University Newman and Bloom in their research concluded that the value of art stems from the creative performance and the degree of physical contact with the original artist[9]. In other words, the artwork would be of a lesser value if it is identified as a forgery because then not only it would have no degree of physical contact with the original artist, but it wouldn’t have been created by the original artist in the first place[10]. Digital art even though being a relatively recent form of art in comparison to physical art, was also plagued by the same infirmities of plagiarism and forgery and unlike in physical art where methods have been developed to tell apart the real from fake, such a thing was almost impossible with respect to digital art unless the artist was able to procure a copyright in relation to the said art[11]. However, NFT’s have sparked a major revolution in the field of digital art and have resulted in exponential growth in the digital art market. As of September 2022, the NFT market has risen to $841 million. The inherent design structure of an NFT being minted on a blockchain based on a distributed ledger (DLT), gives it the characteristics of being timestamped, immutable and traceable have turned it into a valid of certification. In the case of digital art, the NFT is essentially being linked to that digital art and being used as a certificate validating the purchase of an online asset. Not only does this act as a certificate of ownership but also offers traceability because each NFT transaction is recorded on the DLT and now a customer who is buying the NFT can conduct their own due diligence by surveying the ledger and verifying the provenance of the digital art they want to purchase[12]. For the digital artists it also provides other benefits like royalty sharing via smart contracts, access to larger markets and reduction of intermediaries. Royalty sharing is essentially enabled through smart contracts which enable to automatic pay outs to the author on secondary sale of the NFT[13]. The royalty sharing requirements are encoded into a smart contract on the blockchain and are executed automatically when a transaction takes place[14]. NFT’s have also enabled the formulation of NFT marketplaces which are breaking the glass wall between famous and budding artists. Earlier only established artists would have had the opportunity to display their art in galleries and command an audience, and the smaller artists were limited to their social media accounts or other lesser visible platforms to display their art. But now with the help of these online marketplaces the middlemen which were needed to display an artists art work have been cut off and any art work is essentially the exhibited to the innumerable customers who log into these online market places. Issues with the present regime Despite all the new avenues that an NFT has opened for digital artists and the advantages that it provides, not all is merry in the land of NFT’s and there are still some grouses which the current structure of NFT’s seems unable to resolve. Firstly, NFT is often mistaken by its buyers as a certificate of ownership or a certificate of copyright transfer which is certainly not true in every case. In a usual smart contract involving an NFT just the right of personal use of that NFT is transferred and 100% ownership and other intellectual property rights remain with the original creator of the NFT, in fact such contracts are pari materia to when one buys a physical artwork[15][16]. A decentralised organisation called Spice DAO fell prey to this error when they bid $3 million on the NFT of the best-seller novel ‘Dune’, they were unaware that they had just purchased a digital copy of the book and not the rights to the book itself[17]. Molly White who’s a software engineer very succinctly elaborates on the issue and explains that when someone buys an NFT, “They've paid to have their wallet address etched into a database alongside a pointer to something. I wouldn't say they really ‘own’ anything at all.[18]” However, in certain cases NFT’s do transfer the ownership and the copyright only if the owner has programmed them to for example, in the case of Nike where they sold an NFT of virtual sneakers for $130,000[19]. Hence, unless the underlying conditions of an NFT specifically state that about the rights which are being assigned to the purchaser of such NFT, the customer shouldn’t assume otherwise. There still persists an active risk of fraud even after the creator of a digital artwork mints an NFT assigned to it. Theoretically multiple blockchains such as Solana, Binance Smart Chain, Cardano, Tezos etc allow for NFT’s to be minted on them and one can also mint an NFT again on the very same blockchain. This leaves room for scamsters to mint digital artworks of other creators and then presenting them on marketplaces as their own. Even though marketplaces like opensea.io and rarible on their websites promise to reduce fake NFT’s being uploaded, however, whether that promise translates to practice is a completely different story. An artist by the name of Aja Trier claims to have her art stolen and published 86,000 times and listed Opensea,io, these counterfeit NFT’s were only removed after she was able to garner social media traction about the issue. Opensea.io in their own report stated that over 80% of the artwork which was listed on their marketplace was either plagiarised or spam. Opensea.io in an attempt to reduce plagiarised artwork on their website limited the number of free listings that an artist can do on their platform but later had to take down this reform due to backlash by the artists. In the case of another digital artist Mary Campbell, she had her art minted into an NFT and listed on Rarible (which is a digital marketplace) by an unknown person[20]. An important detail in her case was that she had not minted a NFT of any of her artwork while this incident took place. The said person took a screenshot of her art created an NFT assigned to it and listed it for bidding at a starting price of $1200. The said person was later identified, and the listing was taken down. Campbell also reported the incident to Rarible but did not hear back from them. It can be inferred from the aforesaid cases, that these marketplaces are failing to undertake the requisite due diligence measures to verify the authenticity of the digital artwork which they list for sale. And from the cases of Aja Trier and Mary Campbell it is also highlighted that these marketplaces act dumb towards the concerns of digital artists and unlike art distributors or auctioneers instead of conducting the required authenticity checks before listing the digital artwork, have made the process of authentication an extrinsic task. They essentially leave it for the artist themselves to follow up on the authentication process in case a contingency arises[21]. Moreover, artists like Mary Campbell who are oblivious to such NFT marketplaces are more at risk of being exploited. And lastly the most major issue with respect to NFT’s is the legal ambiguities surrounding the technology. In many countries the tax liability in relation to income generated from digital assets has not been set and they are yet to come up with guidelines. Another issue is the legal validity of blockchain and smart contracts, for example in a country like India the validity of blockchain still hangs in the balance after the Supreme Court judgment which overturned the RBI order banning the use of crypto currency by Banks[22]. Furthermore, the Finance Ministry of India also made a statement that it is not planning a complete ban on cryptocurrencies and will allow windows for people to conduct experiments[23]. The law in countries like India and Indonesia is also silent on authentication and settlement of contracts which are a formulation of computer code[24]. The legal enforceability of smart contracts is also brought into question as they need to adapt to current legal contract frameworks across many jurisdictions[25]. Blockchain and smart contracts are the fundamental technologies which are needed to enable NFT’s to function the fact that there is legal uncertainties present in relation to them, casts of a big cloud over the future of NFT’s themselves. Conclusion Despite the aforesaid concerns it can’t be denied that the forthcoming of NFT’s has managed to turn a leaf for the digital artists and provided with a new source of income which they could never have imagined before. NFT’s have accomplished in provided much needed regulation and authentication to an otherwise unregulated art space and lead to the rise of a completely novel digital marketplace. Nevertheless, there is still major ground left to cover. The main reason why NFT’s were said to be beneficial for the world digital arts was their ability to provide time stamped, immutable and traceable data, but as has been clearly enumerated in the examples presented in this reflection paper, such attributes are failing to provide ‘authenticity’ to the digital artwork due to the inefficiencies of the NFT marketplaces. Hence, it becomes extremely crucial for those digital marketplaces that they bring in rigorous security measures to curb the spread of fake digital artwork on their platform, so that the nascent trust in realm of digital art can be maintained and nurtured. This trust would not only have to be fostered in relation to digital artists but also in relation to the consumers of such digital art. The platforms should also ensure the consumers clarity on the kind of rights that would accompany an NFT purchase, so that they don’t feel cheated and as a consequence demotivated to participate in the market again. A fledgling market can only flourish if all its stakeholders have something to gain by participating in it, which is why all its participants should strive towards creating a fair market, as this would help in achieving the twin of objective of kindling newfound demand and having a higher chance of obtaining legal sanction. References [1] Department of Greek and Roman Art, ‘Roman Copies of Greek Statues | Essay | The Metropolitan Museum of Art | Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History’ (The Met’s Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History) accessed 7 November 2022. [2] Id. [3] T. Lenain, Art Forgery The History of a Modern Obsession (Reaktion Books, 1st ed., 2011). [4] G. Newman, P. Bloom, 'Art and Authenticity: The Importance of Originals in Judgments of Value' (2011) Journal of Experimental Psychology . [5] S. Subramanian, 'How to spot a perfect fake: the world’s top art forgery detective' (The Guardian, 2018) accessed October 7, 2022. [6] ‘Forgery - Forgery in the Visual Arts’ (Britannica) accessed 7 November 2022. [7] Graison Dangor, ‘Fake “Mona Lisa” Sells For $3.4 Million' (Forbes, 18 June 2021) accessed 7 November 2022. [8] ‘Sotheby’s Hires Scientist, Addressing Art Market Wariness of Forgeries Post-Knoedler’, (Observer, 8 December 2016) accessed October 7, 2022. [9] Id. [10] Id. [11] ‘Are NFTs Worth the Hype?’ (The Economist, 3 February 2022) accessed 7 November 2022. [12] A. D. Popescu, 'Non-Fungible Tokens (NFT)—Innovation beyond the craze. 5th International Conference on innovation in Business, Economics & Marketing Research' (ResearchGate, 2021). . [13] Alex W Gomezz, ‘NFT Royalties: What Are They and How Do They Work?’ (Cyber Scrilla) accessed 7 November 2022. [14] Id. [15] Robert Goulder, ‘NFTs: The Basics And How To Tax Them’ (Forbes, 15 July 2022) accessed 7 November 2022. [16] Rishubh Agarwal, ‘NFTs: A Boon for Independent Artists or an “Ecological Nightmare Pyramid Scheme”’, (IPR Law India - Indian IP Law Resources, 24 February 2022) . [17] Baisakhi Mishra, ‘NFT Group Bought Dune for $3.04 Million Thinking It Was the Copyright’, (TechStory, 18 January 2022) . [18] Eric Ravenscraft, ‘NFTs Don’t Work the Way You Might Think They Do’ (Wired) accessed 7 November 2022. [19] Daniel Van Boom, ‘These Nike NFT “Cryptokicks” Sneakers Sold For $130K’ (CNET) accessed 7 November 2022. [20] Madelyn Alexander, ‘Digital Art Fraud Made Easy with NFTs’, (The Alabamian, 7 February 2022), accessed 7 November 2022. [21] Will Gottsegen, ‘NFT Forgeries Aren’t Going Away’ (Coindesk, 20 December 2021) accessed 7 November 2022. [22] 2020 SCC Online SC 275 [23] ‘Non-Fungible Tokens: Examining Its Legal Validity in India’ (NLUJ Law Review, 18 June 2021) . [24] Asia Law Journal, ‘NFT Regulations in India and Indonesia’ (Law.asia, 1 December 2021) accessed 7 November 2022. [25] M. Giancaspro, 'Is a ‘smart contract’ really a smart idea? Insights from a legal perspective' (2017) 33(6) Computer Law & Security Review, 825–835.

Digital technologies for sure are disruptive, and their potential to bring these unending changes, to be called as "disruptions" happen in threads. This means that even minute and subtle changes into any sub-segment of a class of technology's subset, can affect global markets at a considerable rate. Some disruptions may be considered natural and gradual, while some might be orchestrated to affect multiple sectors. Let us take a simple example. People may be aware of various kinds of IoT-based devices, which include sensors. Take an electric toothbrush. What are the factors or considerations that may surround the purpose of such a product? So, a commonsensical understanding says that the product is portable, the tracking system within the product provides a lot of data about the consumers who are using the toothbrush. If the toothbrush has some components that can also assess the condition of the teeth and the gums, then even that can be monetised and reduced into data. The understanding is this: when digital technologies cause disruption, it is obvious that the multi-sector, multi-circumstantial impact the disruption brings resembles interconnectedness. This is interesting because lawyers and policy thinkers rarely focus on the interconnectedness of technologies. Now, in the same case of the electric toothbrush, let us suppose you get the data and use algorithms to analyse the patterns, then the whole "responsible AI" paradigm comes in where you have to be compliant with some self-regulatory standards or a regulatory sandbox to assess the effectiveness of the algorithms. Then, the explainability of the algorithms also has to be checked because that determines the business model behind selling and manufacturing the electric toothbrushes beyond consumer law issues. Since, many technology companies who use AI technologies have to address such peculiar and interesting issues, oversight and regulation has become the buzzword. It depends how you use materialise either of them. You can involve the government to act as a regulator or create one, or you may have associations and bodies that can bring the bargain of multiple players on the table for consultation. Auditing and sandbox measures also can be used wisely. Alternatively, companies within their structure or a group of companies among themselves may create consultative or enforcing panels which can act in a "regulatory" fashion to conduct oversight. Recently, some trends have emerged among Twitter, TikTok, Meta and other technology companies, which affect the regulatory landscape in India, Europe and the United States. Taking a dive into the regulatory systems of the EU, China, the US and India, this article analyses the legal workability and fungibility of technology oversight and regulation within the big tech companies and the "Red Tech" (technology companies which are Chinese entities considering aspects of ownership). Regulatory Sovereignty: Recalibrations in the Global North & Reinventing Norms in the Global South Now, there is no generic dichotomy among major countries on this assertion that governments cannot leave technology companies, especially MNCs like Meta, Bytedance and others astray, and some regulatory systems need to be built and enforced, in the fashion that governments and stakeholders would be comfortable with. India is a special case where the government and the stakeholders are proposing unique technology governance models as we see the upcoming G20 Presidency in 2023. The European Union is building sophisticated regulatory frameworks beyond the GDPR already, while the Digital Markets Act is already in force. Anu Bradford has argued the rationale behind the EU's stringent approach to digital governance regulations and legal instruments (such as GDPR, for example) in The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (p.140-41): While these internal motivations to integrate the European market provided the initial impetus for regulating data privacy, the EU’s current regulatory pursuits are also shaped by external motivations. Given the global nature of data processing and the importance of cross-border transfer of data—not just within the EU but across global markets—the EU has recognized the importance of promoting international standards for the protection of personal data. With the GDPR, the EU is thus also seeking to contribute to set the global standard on data privacy with other like-minded countries, cognizant that “if we do not shape standards now, others do,” emphasizing also that those alternative global standards that may emerge may be less desirable in requiring data localization, or leveraging data protection for censorship and state surveillance. [...] Foreign governments, companies, and business groups engaged in active lobbying to mitigate the costs of GDPR on their businesses. The US government was particularly active, opposing the regulation on the grounds that it would kill innovation and research, in addition to hindering national security cooperation. [...] Marketplace discourse is amenable to the idea that an individual consumer can trade his or her commodity—personal data—without strict oversight by public institutions. In contrast, EU institutions assume a strong role in the rights discourse where they have a central role in safeguarding the fundamental rights of its citizens. Alex Turk has described the distinctions between the United States and EU in a similar vein, noting how personal data is viewed as “tradable commodity” in the United States while considered “attributes of our personalities” in the EU. Now, compare this with India's vision of technology and data governance, in the realm of "good" digital public infrastructure (DPI). The larger focus of the Government of India is to build centralised initiatives and systems to safeguard and utilise citizen identity in the digital realm for their welfare and accessibility. Considering the classification of India 1, India 2 and India 3 made in the case of consumers across the country, it is clear that for this decade, the Government is doubling down on accessibility and inclusion in the digital realm, through simplified digital governance measures and promoting technology companies & start-ups (with its own bureaucracy-level features and pitfalls, which are natural when risks are undertaken for good). An article published on DPI by Observer Research Foundation entitled Creating ‘Good’ Digital Public Infrastructure explains this core aspect of Indian technology governance: DPI set up in areas critical to the functioning of an economy must be able to accommodate any unexpected increase in demand in the number of transactions or users, and also be able to respond to the evolving needs of a large and diverse set of users. Promoting and mainstreaming the use of open technologies—such as open-source software, and application programming interfaces and protocols, where anyone is free to access, use and share code—can be useful as they encourage collaboration and distribute the ability to solve population-scale challenges. [...] The technological and legal features of open technologies help governments avoid vendor lock-ins and, consequently, lower the costs of switching between vendors of proprietary software. The adaptability of open technologies is also useful in creating customised solutions tailored to local contexts. In other words, open technologies are a key enabler of citizen-centric innovation. If we take India and the European Union into perspective, it is determinant that both the actors have a citizen-sensitive and conscious ethic behind building facets of digital governance. The difference lies in this: Europe will focus on sophisticated regulations (which even India would need sooner than later) while India would embrace building optimal systems which redefine many aspects of digital inclusion, especially for countries in the Global South. When we analyse the recent orders passed by the Competition Commission of India against Google on OEMs and online payments, it seems apparent that the Government intends to reshape certain first principle points and methods towards shaping digital governance before they develop sophisticated regulations at a statutory level. The approach is rational because in general, India's rule of law and natural justice paradigms are not interpreted nor enforced with a proper sense at the district level. For example, the Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which was struck down by the Supreme Court of India in the infamous Shreya Singhal case, was still used to prosecute individuals at the state level. Now, let us compare the US with the EU here for some perspective. When the Digital Markets Act came into being, the US Chamber of Commerce (USCC) expressed displeasure with the Biden Administration providing specific points of disagreement over the enforcing potential of the EU legislation. Sean Hather, the Senior Vice President of USCC explains the same in an article, whose excerpt has been provided therein: In reality, some of the concerns raised by the Biden Administration on the DMA are sensible. This also shows that sophisticated tendencies over technology regulation, could be expressly stringent, and their practicality may be affected. The European Union has to be sensitive and adaptive with a sector-to-sector approach to shape the paradigms of technology regulation. This is where the maximalist scope and tendency of regulatory systems must be rationed for good. This also shows that leaving countries like India, Singapore, Japan, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and related countries, regulatory tendencies are acting in a maximalist fashion, which may yield some results. However, Europe's approach creates some dysfunction in their regulatory capacity, which could indirectly affect markets in the United States and even India. This comes in when big technology companies based out of the United States and China are found responsible for anti-competitive practices. When the expectations of a regulator are maximalist or impractical, it is apparent that major corporate players may hedge the turmoil and impossibility that comes with those expectations to shape their ways. In the next section, it is discussed how certain major big technology companies are shaping regulation and oversight paradigms. The Big Tech & the Red Tech Let us form some proper context here. The term Big Tech refers to technology companies in the West, including the FAAMG companies. The term Red Tech refers to several Chinese technology companies or technology companies owned by Chinese entities, public and private. When technology companies of the Global North are taken into perspective, we understand that at least despite their intervening and curbing tendency, at least there is a passive case to develop consultative and dispute resolution measures to resolve better sophisticated global legal norms and compliance methods. In the case of Red Tech, the paradigm is dissimulated and uncertain, due to the techno-economic relations among the US and Chinese business communities. Similar may be said when it comes to Indian and Chinese business communities, be it investors, technology companies, facilitators etc. From a legal perspective, the United States is different from China in adopting regulatory oversight wherein their regulatory landscape is still flexible and consultative. In the case of China, the approach is becoming protectionist, thereby an effort to decouple the impact of technology and finance ecosystems in the United States. For sure, China can do that in stealth mode to avoid risks easily and build economic resilience. However, the legal purpose of their regulatory visions is blurring day by day. A certain set of provisions in the Cybersecurity Law of China reflect the same tendency: Article 28: Network operators shall provide technical support and assistance to public security organs and national security organs that are safeguarding national security and investigating criminal activities in accordance with the law. Article 37: Critical information infrastructure operators that gather or produce personal information or important data during operations within the mainland territory of the People’s Republic of China, shall store it within mainland China. Where due to business requirements it is truly necessary to provide it outside the mainland, they shall follow the measures jointly formulated by the State cybersecurity and informatization departments and the relevant departments of the State Council to conduct a security assessment; where laws and administrative regulations provide otherwise, follow those provisions. Here is an excerpt from the Regulations on the Management of Security Vulnerabilities of Network Products approved by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in China, giving a clearly dissimulated outlook towards regulation and oversight. This is where the Chinese model could get counterproductive when their regulatory landscape is dissimulated enough to become complicated. The US and Europe are stuck with the economic risks attached to the technology companies, while the Chinese have over-stringent regulations with steering some efforts towards building an economy of innovation (with Chinese characteristics). India's role becomes prone towards promoting technology for socio-economic development, which is reasonable for the global economy to promote entrepreneurship and better economic practices. Let us now estimate how certain technology companies have achieved or addressed the legal avenues of regulation and oversight. TikTok's Issues on Surveillance and Auditing Tiktok has been contentious due to its data and company ownership issues for long. However, the potential of a low-attention spanning app to surveil populations was not properly understood by several governments in the North Atlantic region. In 2020, India had banned the App among many of Chinese origin or ownership due to these subtle privacy and security issues. The justification of the Government of India was backed by two concerns, data privacy-security issues and international trade law applied on national security considerations, taking into reference that there were border clashes at Galwan in June 2020. Recently, the United States has raised concerns on Tiktok's surveillance features. Emily Baker-White explains this in an article for Forbes: But an important factor distinguishes ByteDance’s planned collection of private users’ information from those cases: TikTok recently told lawmakers that access to certain U.S. user data — likely including location — will be “limited only to authorized personnel, pursuant to protocols being developed with the U.S. Government.” TikTok and ByteDance did not answer questions about whether Internal Audit executive Song Ye or other members of the department are “authorized personnel” for the purposes of these protocols. These promises are part of Project Texas, TikTok’s massive effort to rebuild its internal systems so that China-based employees will not be able to access a swath of “protected” identifying user data about U.S. TikTok users, including their phone numbers, birthdays and draft videos. This effort is central to the company’s national security negotiations with CFIUS. [...] Oracle spokesperson Ken Glueck said that while TikTok does currently use Oracle’s cloud services, “we have absolutely no insight one way or the other” into who can access TikTok user data. “Today, TikTok is running in the Oracle cloud, but just like Bank of America, General Motors, and a million other customers, they have full control of everything they're doing,” he said. It is also clear that to express considerations to promote "transparency", Tiktok has made some express disclosures on privacy policies for European users. Here is an excerpt from the report: TikTok updated its privacy policies for European users on Tuesday, adding explicit disclosures that personal data from the app may be viewed by employees in China. [...] In addition to China, TikTok data may be handled by employees in countries including Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and the US, the company said. Access to European user data, TikTok added, is allowed for “certain employees within our corporate group” and is “based on a demonstrated need to do their job.” Observing this clearly shows that governments in the North Atlantic region are not developing clearer self-regulatory measures, considering the fact that Chinese entities can bear legal justifications for any dissimulated measures to create confusion and uncertainty over their compliance ethics in practice. Outright ban may be possible but the problem with oversight and regulatory ethics is not limited to jurisprudence in a top-down fashion. Restrictive laws can be made, but regulations work when the economic and political coordinates that affect how such regulations and measures may work, are understood. Economic uncertainty looms in due to the interpenetrated relations among Western and Chinese business community people and the directed usage of the technologies among people, not just from an angle of purpose, but also precision. Political uncertainty has less to do with the need to regulate. All regulatory and oversight bodies of any hierarchy are created to develop political consensus within a legal and administrative polity to involve stakeholders. Governments in the North Atlantic region have to develop practical interests to shape their regulatory landscape. For example, the concerns raised by the US Chamber of Commerce on the EU's Digital Markets Act (DMA) may be genuine. However, even some generic implementation of the GDPR (which also is a stringent regulation) was made possible. The European Commission may not conflate GDPR violations with antitrust issues directly, but they can use the sophisticated nature of GDPR and even the DMA to enable some interconnected impact of their regulatory strength. Some hedging has to happen because it is inevitable that maximalist positions (if based on first principles, which is the case with DMA and GDPR to some extent) can be diversified by several countries. In short, territorially, the EU is the epicentre of regulation-related disruptions, which even China intends to be. The problem is this: on data and antitrust, many markets including India are already critical of China. That is not the case with Europe. Of course, the situation with Tiktok shows that dissimulated and protectionist conduct in tech regulation may yield some hedged results, but cannot be pushed further in the long-term aspect. Elon Musk's Ever-dynamic Approach for Twitter There is no doubt that Elon Musk has a special ambition for Twitter. Most of the measures regarding content moderation have not changed. A decision has been made to form a content moderation council for managing Twitter. Much cannot be stated from a legal perspective except some trends regarding the App's moderation and advertising avenues. To keep Twitter paid or not as a whole or in different segments of use is not a legal issue, but to ensure compatible moderation standards and avoid clickbait advertising and hateful & deceitful conduct on the App could be intriguing. Making Twitter a private company has also to do with the lack of clarity the algorithms have as they process user tweets and encourage users to engage, which could become a legal dilemma if free speech is manipulated by algorithms to keep encouraging users to give reactive and overtly contrarian opinions on the platform. Additionally, Twitter has to address the role of technology regulation bodies across the world, including those in India, especially under the IT Rules of 2021. Musk had tweeted once that Twitter has to abide the laws and rules of the countries across the world and free speech laws of those countries are the prerogative of their system and people. Twitter also causes antitrust issues by making US stock markets volatile by mere tweeting on cryptocurrencies and company shares, which also can be addressed if possible. From a competition and data law perspective, Twitter may create a better example of technology regulation and effective business models if the flaws are addressed properly. Apple's Security-Privacy Dynamic Apple's business angle on their guarantees on Privacy against advertisements and the dispute with Facebook explains their security-privacy dynamic. For sure, Apple's products offer security options and convert their privacy-security options into business considerations. There are some genuine concerns shared by Spotify, Meta, Google and others on the 30% commission for hosting on the App Store. Interestingly, the case of antitrust breaches by Apple in India filed by Tinder is unique. Here is an excerpt which explains the reasons why had Tinder filed the same: Match argues in its India filing that users in other countries often prefer to use payment methods which Apple does not permit, and in India a state-backed online transfer system was preferred. "Apple is therefore leveraging its dominant position in the iOS App Store market, to promote the exclusive use of its own payment solution," Mark Buse, head of global government relations for Match, said in the filing. Even when the Competition Commission of India had imposed penalties on Google on the OEMs and the Android Device Ecosystem, their explanation on the non-substitutability of the Play Store and the App Store is intriguing: Apple’s business is primarily based on a vertically integrated smart device ecosystem which focuses on sale of high-end smart devices with state of the art software components. Whereas Google’s business was found to be driven by the ultimate intent of increasing users on its platforms so that they interact with its revenue earning service i.e., online search which directly affects sale of online advertising services by Google. [...] The Commission examined the substitutability between Google’s Play Store for Android OS and Apple’s App Store for iOS from the perspective of all three demand constituents and found that there is that no substitutability between Google’s Play Store and Apple’s App Store. The CCI further noted that there might be some degree of competition between the two mobile ecosystems i.e., Android and Apple, however, that too is also limited at the time of deciding as to which device to buy. At that stage also, the CCI was of the considered view that the primary and the most significant factor in the mind of an end user is the hardware specification and the device price. While antitrust is a genuine area where Apple could be affected in the North Atlantic region, another issue which Apple has to resolve is their impact on small businesses and the algorithmic dragnet which affects several users. Ben Thompson explains the impact of Apple's App Tracking Transparency (ATT) policy in Stratechery: One of the interesting aspects of the company’s App Tracking Transparency (ATT) policy is that it very much touches on property rights. Most of the headlines (and, frankly, impact on advertising earnings) are about the unique Identifier for Advertisers (IDFA); post-ATT you only get the IDFA from end users if they agree to Apple’s prompt about tracking (which, it’s worth repeating, is much scarier than Apple’s own prompt). Apple can enforce this on a technical level: if you don’t agree to the prompt, then iOS simply doesn’t give you a valid IDFA. [...] However, ATT goes much further than this: it also decrees that you cannot “track” users using any other method; for example, a merchant as part of a sale almost certainly captures a user’s email address. However, that merchant cannot share that email address with Facebook, which would allow Facebook to match that purchase to an ad shown to a user with the same email address. Apple is not blocking this technically — all of this communication would happen on a server-to-server basis, not via the user’s iPhone — but they are blocking it legislatively, with the threat of App Review blocking the Facebook app. Conclusion Dysfunction is a real threat to self-regulation and owning the sophisticated and dissimulated form of operations that technology companies aspire for. There is some public discussion in place about the need to have public utility declared over platforms like Facebook, Twitter and others, by governments, in the US, India and other places. The problem yet remains unresolved even if that is being thought of: tech companies do not disclose enough and governments still fail to understand how the element of technology as a realm can be adjusted with the human element of accountability, privacy, foresight and explainability. There are genuine issues with political clarity but consultative engagement, for sure would legitimise the oversight and regulation bodies. Legal workability is the key to shape soft law principles which can be helpful.

The idea of a parallel virtual world has intrigued minds since several decades. The advent of the metaverse has created such possibility into a reality, resulting in significant benefits for users and business entities alike. The metaverse is an enabler for users from different parts of the world to engage in gaming, entertainment, social and business-related activities through a virtual medium in a digitally parallel world leading to creation of wealth, opportunities and recreational value. Since several transactions take place on a recurrent basis in the metaverse, the scope for Governments to tax such transactions also have immense potential. However, it is necessary that the methods and medium of tax do not deter the development of the metaverse in any manner. Similar to jurisdictions across the world, metaverse adopters in India have continuously been on the rise, consequently resulting in the increase in taxable transactions. However, the opportunity to tax has been undermined because of the absence of an effective mechanism to levy and collect such tax on metaverse transactions. With effect from 01st July 2017, a unified indirect tax system known as the Goods and Services Tax was implemented. Till date, several difficulties and ambiguities exist in the levy and collection of Goods and Services Tax on metaverse transactions and therefore, the present article is aimed at identifying concerns and addressing them with the goal of proposing more clarity in respect of Goods and Services Tax on Metaverse transactions in India. Understanding the Metaverse As evident from Figure 1 above, the Metaverse is a virtual world, parallel to the real world wherein users interact by way of digital avatars created by them. Depending upon use cases, the users may immerse in the Metaverse by using virtual reality in order to enhance their experience. There are tremendous use cases and the most prominent ones which have been seen so far are gaming, entertainment uses, advertisement of products, a host of virtual economic activities using cryptocurrencies or barters of non- fungible tokens, purchase and sale of assets in the Metaverse, content creation leading to the development of the Metaverse itself, conduct of social, collaborative and virtual events and planning, designing and testing activities in the Metaverse for potential products which may be offered in the real world. The list exponentially continues to grow recurrently, and it may not be surprising to see full- fledged livelihoods being supported by the numerous potentials of the Metaverse in the near future. From the Indian perspective, there is increasing interest and adoption of the Metaverse amongst Indian users. Data suggests that more than 5 lakh Indian users have shown interest in being a part of Metaverse projects up till the end of last year, making it fifth (5th) in the world in rankings of user interest in Metaverse projects. Due to the immense potential and possibilities of Metaverse in India, it is necessary for legal challenges to be addressed. Although legal challenges emanating from the Metaverse will span several specializations of law, this article is strictly focused on Goods and Services Tax (India’s indirect tax system) on Metaverse transactions. Basic Outline and Structure of the Goods and Services Tax Law in India Figure 2 above showcases that several statutes and rules emanating from such statutes are a part of the Goods and Services Tax law in India. The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concurrently apply to intra- state transactions, i.e., within the boundaries of the State itself. The State Goods and Services Tax statutes are in the names of the respective States such as the Madhya Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and so on. Similarly, where business transactions are carried out within a Union Territory then the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 have concurrent application. The concurrent application of these laws is a manifestation of co-operative federalism between the Centre and the States which is imbibed in the Goods and Services Tax law. The Central, State and Union Territory laws have delegated legislation in the form of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, State Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 emanating from the parent statute. In inter- state transactions, imports and exports, the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and its delegated legislation, the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 are applicable. The Goods and Services Tax Settlement of Funds Rules, 2017 conjointly emanate from the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribing reporting and compliance standards for the Government in order to ensure effective distribution of Goods and Services Tax Revenue as per the scheme and mechanism envisaged under the law. The Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 and its respective delegated legislations such as the Goods and Services Tax Compensation Cess Rules, 2017 and Goods and Services Tax (Period of Levy and Collection of Cess) Rules, 2017 explicate the levy of Cess on the amount of Goods and Services Tax on luxurious goods and demerit goods with the purposes of compensating the State Governments for the losses incurred by them on account of the change in indirect tax system in India. Under the scheme of the Goods and Services Tax law in India, the subject matter of tax is “supply” which can include supply of goods, supply of services or supply of both goods and services in mixed or composite form. For the purposes of classification of goods, alignment is made to the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 which in turn is aligned with the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (referred to as the Harmonised System of Nomenclature or HSN in common parlance). For the classification of services, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs has devised the Services Accounting Code (SAC) which is based on the United Nations Central Product Classification. As far as the rates of Goods and Services Tax and exemptions are concerned, they are prescribed by way of Notifications for both goods as well as services. Principally, the rates of Goods and Services Tax as prescribed in the Notification are 0.25%, 3%, 5%, 12%, 18% and 28%. Determining and Identifying Nature of Transaction and Charge of Goods and Services Tax The first and foremost challenge which will have to be addressed and solved in respect of Metaverse transactions would be to determine their nature as either goods or services. Before moving forward, it is necessary to explicate that in order to avoid multiplicity in provisions, the provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 have been adopted by the State, Union Territory and Integrated Goods and Services Tax legislations and therefore, the definitions of the Central law would apply to all other Goods and Services Tax statutes as well. The term ‘goods’ has been defined under Section 2(52) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to include all movable property including actionable claims and things attached or forming part of land but excludes money and securities. The term ‘services’ has been defined under Section 2(102) as anything other than goods, money or securities and has included activities related to either use or conversion of money. Under the Goods and Services Tax system, digital goods are treated as services by way of legal fiction through powers conferred under Section 7(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. In furtherance of this, the concept of ‘online information database access and retrieval services’ was envisaged, and the supply of digital goods has been subjected to the ‘services treatment’ for the purposes of levy and collection of Goods and Services Tax. Therefore, the nature of Metaverse transactions irrespective of whether digital goods or digital services are being provided, would be treated as “service” for the purposes of levy and collection of Goods and Services Tax as online information database access and retrieval services. To illustrate, irrespective of whether a Metaverse user sells virtual property or hosts an event for which consideration is collected, it would still be treated as a “service” by way of legal fiction. The second challenge which will have to be addressed and solved is identifying if Goods and Services Tax has to be paid on forward charge or reverse charge basis on Metaverse transactions. For this, it is necessary to first understand the scope of online information database access and retrieval services which is explicated by way of the table below. The aforesaid table showcases the scope of online information database access and retrieval services as provided under Section 2(17) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Transactions in the Metaverse would also be covered under its ambit since the indicative list of online information database access and retrieval services is an inclusive and detailed list capable of covering activities of the Metaverse. Coming to the issue of forward charge or reverse charge, the figure below demonstrates the different scenarios and links it with the forward or reverse charge payment postulated under the scheme of the Goods and Services Tax law. Figure 4 above envisages five scenarios. First is where the supplier of service as well as the recipient of service in a Metaverse transaction are located within India. In such instance, the Goods and Services Tax will have to be paid under forward charge. This means that the supplier of service will collect the applicable tax amount from the recipient of service along with the consideration amount and pay it in the Government Treasury. The second scenario is where the supplier is located outside India and the recipient of the service is located in India having valid Goods and Services Tax registration. Under such circumstances, Goods and Services Tax will have to be paid under reverse charge. This means that the supplier cannot collect any Goods and Services Tax amount from the recipient and the recipient itself will self- assess and deposit the applicable Goods and Services Tax in the Government Treasury. The third scenario is where the supplier is located outside India and the recipient is located in India, but being an end consumer is not registered under the Goods and Services Tax law. Under such circumstances, the supplier will have to deposit Goods and Services Tax on a forward charge basis even though it is located outside the taxable territory. For this purpose, the concept of non- residential taxable person has been stipulated under the Goods and Services Tax law. The fourth scenario is where in the Metaverse transaction, the supplier is located in India but the recipient is located outside India. In this transaction, Goods and Services Tax will have to be paid on forward charge basis and the supplier will pay the Goods and Services Tax amount after collecting the said amount along with consideration from the recipient of service who is located outside India. The fifth scenario is where both, the supplier as well as the recipient of service are located outside India and thus, Goods and Services Tax is not leviable. Classification of Metaverse Transactions under GST Since the nature and liability of tax in Metaverse transactions have been discussed, it is necessary to now address classification of such transactions. The Tariff Heading where Metaverse transactions can be classified is Heading 99.84.39 which reads as, “Other on-line contents nowhere else classified” and the rate of tax applicable is 18%. This is because any transaction which occurs in the Metaverse would be nothing but transfer of data over the medium of internet and such transfer of data over the medium of internet would be treated as “online content” for the purposes of Goods and Services Tax. For example, if a user decides to build a house in the Metaverse or purchase a car in the Metaverse then it would, in the core sense be transfer of data over the medium of internet classifying it as online content being supplied as online information database access retrieval services for the purposes of levy and collection of Goods and Services Tax. Valuation of Metaverse Transactions under GST The next challenge which requires to be addressed is valuation under the Goods and Services Tax of Metaverse transactions. Section 15 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rules 27 to 35 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 stipulate the valuation provisions. When payment for a Metaverse transaction is made in Indian currency, then there would not arise any problems since the general valuation provision under Section 15(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 which states that the transaction value would be the price actually paid or payable and Goods and Services Tax at the rate of 18% would be attracted on such price. However, payments in the Metaverse are also being made in cryptocurrencies which are not recognized as legal tender in India and thus, will constitute as barter. The scope of supply as envisaged under Section 7 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 embraces barter transactions and therefore, levy and collection of Goods and Services Tax have to be made on barter transactions as well. For cryptocurrencies, it is a challenge from the Indian context to conduct valuation for the purposes of Goods and Services Tax. Rule 27 read with Section 15(4) would become applicable in such instance and the open market value of the supply will determine the value of supply. This means that in case payment is made in cryptocurrency in a Metaverse transaction, then the market value of the cryptocurrency on the date on which payment is received by the supplier (as per time of supply provision under Section 13 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017) would become the value and Goods and Services Tax at the rate of 18% will have to be paid on such transaction. Conclusion In view of the discussions undertaken in the present article, it is quite clear that several challenges exist for taxpayers and tax administration alike in levying and collecting Goods and Services Tax and it is necessary for such challenges to be taken up during the Goods and Services Tax Council Meetings and consequent mechanism to be created in order for there to be better clarity in respect of levy and collection of Goods and Services Tax on Metaverse transactions.

Recently, on July 2, 2022, the Indian Judiciary made history of good jurisprudence in the field of Indian Securities Law. This was done through a 20-year long pending petition against Balaji and Co., i.e., the accused in the instant matter, by the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), i.e., the complainant in the instant matter. The contention of the complainant was that the accused had been dealing in the securities market as an unregistered sub-broker, i.e., without rightfully obtaining a registration certificate from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). It was considered to be a grave offence when it was pointed out that the accused had played a hideous role in duping innocent people who were dealing in the securities market by providing them with a couple of fake shares. The article explains the judicial development and its significance. SEBI Regulations on Stock Brokers Before the article proceeds to get on to the result of the case against the accused, i.e., Balaji and Co., it is important for one to be able to understand the contention of the complainant. As according to Rule 3 of the SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub-brokers) Regulations of 1992, a stock broker is particularly mandated to make an application to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for the grant of the registration certificate. It is imperative to understand in the instant context that without the proper grant of a certificate to the stock broker, it is not eligible to act as such. Thus, in this manner, the certificate granted by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) acts as a form of an authorisation for such a stock broker. The presence of this rule alone makes it clear that the intention of drafting it was to specify the eligibility of the person who may be eligible to act as a stock broker. Since in the instant matter, Balaji and Co., was not an eligible entity to do so, the subsequent acts conducted by it were considered to be against the rules mentioned under the SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub-brokers) Regulations of 1992. Thus, based on this contention, the complainant filed an application under the SEBI as soon as it was able to under Section 24 of the SEBI Act of 1992, contending that the accused was in violation of Section 12 of the SEBI Act of 1992, Regulation 3 of the SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub-brokers) Regulations of 1992, and Section 17 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) F of 1956 on 24th September 2002, all of which sum up to the same violation more or less, i.e., acting without a proper grant of certificate. It was, however, observed that the complainant had delayed in filing the complaint against the accused in the present petition, bringing out an important issue in today’s discussion about the development of the jurisprudence in regards to the Indian Securities Law, i.e., whether a delay in the filing of a complaint against an unregistered sub-broker can be condoned by the court or not, and whether the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act of 1974 can be applied or not. The Balaji and Co. Case and its Significance To be more specific in layman’s terms, the court needed a valid explanation in terms of Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 in regards to why there was a delay of a total of 106 days, i.e., approximately three months and fourteen days in the filing the complaint against Balaji and Co., i.e., the accused in the present matter. Moreover, in addition to the above, the counsel for the accused also contended in front of the just court that the complainant had brought forth the present application after twenty years after the court had already taken cognizance of the fact that the schedule of the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 does not include the SEBI Act of 1992; thus, highlighting the legislative intent to exclude the same. Thus, it was pointed out by the counsel for the accused that it would be completely unreasonable on the part of the court to condone a delay after such cognisance has been taken, while it additionally has not satisfied itself in regards to why such delay in filing the application took place in the first place. The analysis of the jurisprudence that marks the first few pages in the advent of the Indian Securities Law took place when the counsel for the accused, based on the aforementioned contentions submitted in front of the court that the application was not maintainable. The story takes an even more interesting turn when the court interprets the language of the legislature in Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 to carve out the sweet-smelling honey of justice. To quote the words delivered by the Supreme Court of India, “Section 473, CrPC does not in any clear terms lay down that the application should be filed at the time of filing challan itself. The words ‘so to do in the interest of justice' are wide enough.” To understand this part by part, one must first understand the contents of Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which states that any court has the power to take cognisance in regards to an offence after the limitation period associated with it has ended if it is able to satisfy itself based on the facts and circumstances of the case that such delay has been properly explained, or if taking such an action is necessary for the court in order to aid the hands of justice in accordance with the law of the land. In the present matter in relation to the matter of Balaji and Co., i.e., the accused, the court has exceptionally exercised its inherent powers that have been vested upon it by a part of Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 (implicated through a thorough interpretation of the provision) by pronouncing that since the accused had played a role in imposing fraudulent behaviour upon the public, the court found it necessary to intervene and condone such a delay of 106 days in filing a complaint against the accused. However, although on one hand, the counsel for the complainant won the battle in being able to help the hands of justice meet, it erred in understanding certain parts of the way the law of the land essentially works, thus marking a possibly dangerous precedent that the Indian judiciary could not have accepted. To explain why it faced a delay in filing the complaint against the accused under Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the complainant had claimed that since the SEBI Act of 1992 had replaced the Capital Issues (Control) Act of 1947, the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act of 1974 should apply to the SEBI Act of 1992 by way of simple interpretation of the legislature after the repeal of the Capital Issues (Control) Act of 1947. However, the court while analysing what both the parties had to say claimed that the contention of the complainant is ‘unacceptable,’ since the schedule in the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act of 1974 never got amended and never explicitly mentioned the SEBI Act of 1992, thus, stripping off the power granted by the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act of 1974 that was quoted by the complainant. Hence, it cannot be said that the SEBI Act of 1992 is subsequently devoid of the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 on the abovementioned ground. Conclusion Based on the abovementioned explanation, the just court of law presiding over the instant matter rejected the argument of the complainant and held that since a delay has in fact occurred in the process of filing the complaint against the accused, the complainant should seek condonation. However, it is also interestingly observed that despite the failure of the complainant on a major ground, the court accepted its explanation for such a delay in filing the complaint based on the ground that since the SEBI Act of 1992 in itself is considered to be a legislation that promotes the core value of social welfare and growth of the securities market. Moreover, it is one of the paramount duties of the court of law to be able to adopt an interpretation which is able to further the purpose of such a law, thus promoting the actual intent of it. Hence, in this manner, the court made significant history in regards to the field of the Indian Securities Law by filling in the gaps that were present in the subject matter in relation to understanding the legislative intent of the proposed laws in relation to the limitation period of offences that come under the SEBI Act of 1992.

In India, practices related to competitive and anti-competitive practices, in the post-1990 period, are regulated under the helm of the Competition Act, 2002. However, we are aware of the fact that this act requires some tremendous changes, so that it adapts with the information age we all live in. As of now, it has become obvious that India’s key strength at the level of diplomatic engagement and influence, is reliant on a new critical domain, which the Union Government has adapted with time - digital technologies. There are obvious reasons why India aims to become a technology superpower or at least a regulatory superpower in digital technologies, maybe in the lines of/better than the European Union. In this article, it is proposed how India can transform its competition policy, which is dynamic and adaptive, in sync with its technology policy. India’s Technology Policy at a Glance India’s tech policy is a mixed bag. However, the bureaucratic efforts to stabilise and empower its technology governance efforts has become quite visible. Now, there are some key areas, which complete the trajectory of the technology policy. In some ways, the developments should have been achieved way before, but maybe one advantage that India does have as compared to Japan, China, Singapore and other Asian economies is the Indo-Pacific situation. It is assumed that technology as a domain area for being distinctive need not be interconnected to other policy domains of concern. However, the generalising (and homogenising) tendency of technology as we know, has led us to the reality where the role of technology has become generalist in many ways possible. Even in jurisprudence, technology law has the potential, in real terms, to gain the status of generalist purpose, akin to international law and public law. That is accounted due to the penetrable nature of the field, which countries across the world are concerned about. Not only it complicates the policy discourse surrounding technology governance, but it compels policymakers to propose sensible interconnected legal and policy conundrums, which germinate the purpose and extent of digital technologies in this information age. Of course, the extent of digital technologies may not be the same in every domain or industry, even if many technology enthusiasts and industrial leaders might envision the same. It is therefore necessary that India adapts to pursue rejuvenating its technology policy, which is all-comprehensive with its own speciality and mobility. As discussed in the Book Review of “The Network State”, there could be a situation, where technology policies of the US and China would target the most active and evolving element of critical technology - mobility. Legal thinking can be used to create visible spaces for positional inference to guide tech-oriented mobility in various industries, which is where India’s concerns largely would lie. As of now, it is visible that technology governance in India, despite the absence of relevant legislations (and the presence of some sector-specific regulations), guides international trade, sustainable development, entrepreneurship and innovation. Now, a regulatory regime is essential to India’s technology policies, which has a clear juristic understanding of ethical and unethical practices. The problem with the earlier withdrawn Data Protection Bill clearly was its arbitrary nature on multiple grounds. Another major reason for the withdrawal of the Bill is that India is required to enact a data protection law, which is effective, reasonable and far-reaching in line with other technology regulators in Europe and Asia. It is true that certain big tech companies did not adhere with the IT Rules of 2021 in a proper manner. However, a pre-emptive approach to create pressure and constraints for foreign companies would not be helpful in handling the issues associated with the intermediaries. There is another issue with India’s technology law approach that it lacks a sectorial vision in understanding technology governance. Nevertheless, the effective measures that the Reserve Bank of India and SEBI adopt to govern fintech companies and their activities & operations are still better than those of the IT Ministry. It is thereby proposed that shaping competition policy can help in cultivating a sector-to-sector approach towards technology regulation. Considering the scope of the proposed Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2022 (currently under review in Standing Committee in Lok Sabha), it is proposed that India requires to assess the possibility of a dynamic competition policy, which enables Indian market players and regulators to establish more equitable positions amidst the regulatory systems of the US, China and the European Union. Regulating competitive practices is not possible under obsolete frameworks and legal definitions. This also links to the entrepreneurial culture and management practices which shape the trajectory of corporate governance in India. Looking it from a perspective of knowledge management and systems, making competition policy dynamic enhances the bargaining power of Indian regulators. It also enables to have a design-oriented perspective on anti-competitive practices in the markets. In the next section, the theory of dynamic competition and its scope in the Indo-Pacific region is proposed and discussed. Dynamic Competition Law in the Indo-Pacific Dynamic competition has been discussed as a concept for long. This article, entitled Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, authored by Sidak and Teece explains dynamic competition and its development in American Law: Schumpeter was among the first to declare that perfect competition was incompatible with innovation. He noted that “[t]he introduction of new methods of production and new commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect—and perfectly prompt—competition from the start. And this means that the bulk of what we call economic progress is incompatible with it.” […] The fact that perfect competition is inconsistent with innovation does not necessarily mean that monopoly is a requirement. Schumpeter himself recognized, as we do, the importance of pluralism and rivalry in the economic system. However, one need not define rivalry as occurring inside some tightly circumscribed “antitrust market” containing only existing competitors, with their capabilities proxied by existing market shares. Moreover, numerous variables complicate any simple relationship between the generation of monopolistic rents and the allocation of resources to develop new products and processes. In general terms, dynamic competition implies that innovation and evolutionary considerations guide the transformation of markets and their product & process innovations. The neoclassical understanding of regulating prices as the key aspect of competition law does not bode well for the Global South countries, including India, because it is essential to incorporate the potential and scope of complexity science to determine how digital products and services affect unrelated industry sectors and their economic cycles. For example, the policy discourse on responsible artificial intelligence ethics completely ignores the competition law outlook on the ethics of AI. There are economic considerations behind the inclusion and democratisation of AI technologies, and the mere process if is not understood from a corporate governance perspective, then merely having oversight boards and self-regulated solutions, generally do not serve the cause of AI ethics. The 2nd-order effects of such activities could be reckoned in unrelated sectors and the complexity behind the manipulation of digital markets must be understood properly. According to Anouk van der Veer in Calling For a New Theory of Dynamic Competition (2022), for Network Law Review: Dynamic competition draws on innovation economics as defined by Austrian School economists, e.g., Schumpeter and Hayek. Whereas neoclassical economics focuses on reaching economic equilibrium, Austrian economists see competition as a process in a state of disequilibrium. By extension, elements such as products, demand, and supply should not be taken as static data. These elements are subject to constant change due to companies striving for innovation and growth rather than economic efficiency. Dynamic competition looks at competition coming from “the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization”. Taking into perspective the digital realm in the Indo-Pacific region (most of Asia), dynamic competition, especially in the case of digital technologies - is an important necessity to understand. It enables actors and regulators to work on empowered legal, policy and entrepreneurial solutions, which enable sustenance and growth. Now, according to van der Veer, there are four aspects1, which shape dynamic competition per se in her article - (1) innovation economics; (2) evolutionary theory; (3) complexity theory; and (4) resource-based theory. My assessment is that (the proposition may relate to the regulatory landscape in Europe, yet) this approach is contextually relevant even in the case of India as an aspiring regulatory superpower. Thus, as per the diagram below, India must ponder upon adopting a dynamic competition approach, which caters to four important factors: innovation, transformation, adaptivity and values. Let us understand how each of these four factors are necessary. Innovation relates to questions related to intellectual property rights, and impact analysis examining ripple effects in other relevant sectors and industries. Transformation, which relates to the evolutionary theory, implies how regulatory expectations keep up with times and promote Soft Law measures (for example, self-regulation measures to be undertaken by Cab Aggregators as directed by the Competition Commission of India, recently) and the interconnectedness of digital markets is dealt in a creative manner. Adaptivity, refers to Complexity Theory (also known as Complexity Science), which is also important because understanding risks, development cycles and trends help us to find bottom-top regulatory solutions when top-down measures incur limitations and are static. It also enables us to adopt mature and flexible legislative solutions in future. Now, Values, refer to the moral component of dynamic competition here. However, they also include the adoption of resource-based theory, where, let us say any digital product or service would be subject to value assessments. The ethics behind these assessments and background checking for sure guide the moral compass of decision-making at best, and makes dynamic competition rooted to realities. In the next section, the propositions to shape India’s Competition Law regime are discussed. Initial Propositions and the Conclusion Usually, dynamic competition has been misinterpreted as a means to justify the financialisation of the “free market” as we call it by the big tech companies, especially the FAAMG companies. However, understanding dynamic competition for sure enables countries like India, which as of the current economic situation, despite pitfalls, has survived and is growing sustainably. As a developing country and a middle power, India’s economic outlook towards assessing any potential anti-competitive practice may be different. Although it could be an early proposition to anticipate the need of dynamic competition policies in India, due to the economic situation and the maturation of market players. At least to begin with, India may address two important questions: How much inherent and connected digital technologies have become to restrict or affect competition? How much multi-sector or cross-sector impact of digital technologies as products or services could be determinable under the current Competition Act, 2002 and the regulatory landscape? We have to anticipate the proposed Digital India Act, and maybe a newly introduced Personal Data Protection Bill to see how the Union Government addresses these 2 questions. However, looking at the trend of technology companies gaining impetus, it is apparent that the penetrability of digital products and services in certain cases, can become cross-sectoral. We are already seeing that trend with several fintech applications, and the restrictions on cryptocurrencies by RBI. Even several tech-based aggregator companies are under the radar, which shows that like any information and innovation economy, India is not innovating enough in that way as players in the EU, China and the US are seeking towards. Nevertheless, the language of innovation in economics does not end with the static vision of “monopoly” and there are possibilities of mediating the protectionist and all-pervading tendencies of innovation. Even in the recently proposed Indian Telecommunication Bill, 2022, the Union Government has proposed to broaden the definition of telecommunication services to include OTT communication services, internet-based communication services and broadcasting services among others. This is intriguing because it may be possible that market players in the OTT industry, for example, would have to take licenses, share revenue with the government and be treated to same rules as telecom service providers. A little relatable example comes from France where Netflix was obligated to invest 20-25% French revenues in French content under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive of the European Union. Creative solutions like these can be achieved in their own realms and economic-legal basis, if self-regulation serves some developments. It however does not mean that dynamic competition justifies any state-led or private sector-led weaponisation of technology-based market economy. Where India stands is perhaps at the aisle of preventing major competition law violations, and also mediating way for sustainable and distinctive innovations, which may further the cause in Africa, Latin America and the rest of the Indo-Pacific as well.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) is known for its proactive approaches in addressing the anti-competitive practices of certain FAAMG companies in India. Yesterday at 8.57 PM IST, a Press Release by PIB informed about the CCI’s imposition of penalty on Google, which reads as follows: The Competition Commission of India (Commission) has imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,337.76 crore on Google for abusing its dominant position in multiple markets in the Android Mobile device ecosystem, apart from issuing cease and desist order. The CCI also directed Google to modify its conduct within a defined timeline. In this article, I will deconstruct the press release and elaborate about the purpose, significance and legal outlook that CCI and Google could take up on this order. To begin with, the order is significant. The detail however lies in the purposive aspect that the Commission is interested in. The Order, Deconstructed The CCI focuses on the 5 kinds of markets in India, with which the Android Mobile Device ecosystem can be related with, on the basis of which the Commission imposes penalty on Google: Market for licensable OS for smart mobile devices in India Market for app store for Android smart mobile OS in India Market for general web search services in India Market for non-OS specific mobile web browsers in India Market for online video hosting platform (OVHP) in India. Now, this is no revelation, because the markets posited by the Commission are obviously critical, when it comes to Indian digital markets. According to CCI, the legitimate basis of delineating the 5 markets comes from understanding Google and Apple’s business incentives behind even dominating mobile device and applications ecosystem. Google’s approach towards garnering consumers is a horizontal approach, i.e., “increasing users on its platforms so that they interact with its revenue earning service i.e., online search which directly affects sale of online advertising services by Google.“ The reason this is a horizontal approach is, because ecosystem, which Google has maintained, relies on the proximity of services, which could be interconnected or limitedly distinct, for example, YouTube, Google Maps, etc. On the other hand, Apple’s larger focus is creating a vertical chain of high-end smart devices, in the form of an ecosystem (which we can understand from Apple’s Privacy Features, thereby clearly affecting Meta (Facebook), Spotify and other companies). In a nutshell, the main 3 points depicted in this diagram made by CCI explain why they have imposed penalty on Google, as of now, focusing on the three consumer groups. Now, on OEMs, the CCI has made valid points, which, despite being preliminary, has substance. Let us also analyse what measures regarding OEMs, have been recommended by the CCI: OEMs shall not be restrained from (a) choosing from amongst Google’s proprietary applications to be pre-installed and should not be forced to pre-install a bouquet of applications, and (b) deciding the placement of pre-installed apps, on their smart devices. This measure is genuine, and practical enough. Deciding the placement of pre-installed apps, is undoubtedly connected to the lack of choice that Google offers via making its proprietary applications, when they are pre-installed. Licensing of Play Store (including Google Play Services) to OEMs shall not be linked with the requirement of pre-installing services and apps offered by Google. Delinking the pre-installing requirement is also a genuine measure, which is a consumer-friendly measure, to promote the economics of choice. Google shall not deny access to its Play Services APIs to disadvantage OEMs to ensure interoperability of apps between Android OS to meet compatibility requirements of Android Forks and Google. The measure is reasonable, and would create safer spaces for OEMs in India, especially in the digital markets. Google shall not impose anti-fragmentation obligations on OEMs. OEMs should be permitted to manufacture / develop Android forks based smart devices for themselves. Google shall not incentivise or otherwise obligate OEMs for not selling smart devices based on Android forks. Now, there is no doubt that the measures proposed in good faith, are rational and bear context. Now, it would be appropriate to assess the repercussions of this order, only with a competition law perspective because the technology law governance framework in India, is yet to be legislated beyond the Information Technology Act, 2000, which again, considering the 2021 Rules, only would trace the role of Google as an intermediary. We have to understand that on technology-related adherence, big tech companies have not properly adhered with India’s requirements. Part of the blame goes to the companies not being concerned, while the other issue lies with the Government for coming up with impractical rules. This excerpt from an article published by Swarajya on the IT Rules explains the issues, for example, in the Part II, Rule 5, Sub-rule 8: The author explains the issues in this sub-rule: If the intention of the government was to bar the intermediaries from playing publishers, then there was no need to lay down elaborate ground rules for censoring. Some might want to argue that this censoring is in relation to the orders passed by the court or the government but for such requests, others clauses have adequately dealt with in depth. Another error was pointed out in Rules 3(2) and 4(6) by the author, which further explains the Government’s failure in creating practical regulations: This is in addition to all the requests that the intermediaries have to comply with from the law enforcement agencies and the government departments. Given the number of users, it would be practically impossible for any intermediary to adhere to these rules even if they hire an army of employees to execute it. It seems that the rules have been framed to ensure non-compliance and create numerous loopholes to punish intermediaries than come up with a decent mechanism that is aimed at resolving genuine problems. Even the earlier Data Protection Bill proposed had innumerable errors, which needed correction. Unless any consistent regulation or law is approved, which has a flexible approach, mere posture to regulate does not suffice. It is reasonable to state that CCI’s approach towards FAAMG companies and their anti-competitive practices, at best, has been consistent and specific. The problems raised are clearly genuine. Can there be a Possibility of Self-Regulation and Ex-Ante Measures? Now, it is obvious that the CCI points out to the bundling of services and products and leveraging practice attributed to the same in the case of Google. However, there are genuine concerns on the regulatory landscape. Vikas Kathuria discusses the same in an article for Observer Research Foundation: The antitrust issues that have arisen elsewhere have resonated in India as well. There have been five cases against Google before the Competition Commission of India (CCI) spanning search, Android OS and Play Store. […] While the CCI is doing its bit to ensure fairness in digital markets, a need for some form of regulation is already felt. In its e-commerce market study, the CCI has mentioned the need for marketplace platforms adopting self-regulation to ensure transparency concerning search ranking; collection, use and sharing of data; user review and rating mechanism; revision in contract terms; and discount policy. This form of regulation, however, falls far short of preemptive ex-ante regulation that the EU has suggested in the proposed Digital Markets Act for ‘gatekeeper’ platforms. Consequently, India should adopt binding ex-ante regulations for digital ‘gatekeepers’ to ensure market contestability for businesses including start-ups and fairness for users. The CCI’s measures, if looked closely, show that they might indicate Google to adopt some course correction measures to indicate their focus towards self-regulation, based on the details and data Google had offered them. Although, self-regulation measures can be legitimised through any new rules or notifications, the Commission in the case of cab aggregators, has released an advisory on self-regulating measures. Now, as Kathuria suggests, an ex-ante regulation could be a good tool for the Commission to further steer their measures on “gatekeeper platforms” like Google and Apple. However, a reason that CCI has not come up with any proposed regulation, is because advisories and orders, may be used for a piecemeal approach to address anti-competitive practices, considering the strategic market status (SMS) of companies of those sorts. In the Indian case, there is no legal understanding or basis of the term “strategic market status”. Maybe the Commission could find it reasonable not to integrate their focus on companies which may fit the category of SMS, as of now. Nevertheless, the Government of India is certainly interested to create a technology and competition governance framework, which addresses the problem of vulnerability in the markets due to the presence of companies in multiple sectors. We can safely state that this order, is clear in addressing Google’s dominant position. However, from a governance perspective, it is necessary that the Commission may opt to estimate what kind of self-regulatory measures can be adopted with time. Common Issues, Special Approach India’s competition law approach towards FAAMG companies is specific and practice-focused, despite the obvious fact that many issues raised by the regulatory body on the anti-competitive practices, are commonly faced by regulators across the globe. Biding time would be necessary, before self-regulatory or ex-ante measures could be endorsed by the Government. However, the CCI through such orders and advisories, can attempt to address and embrace India’s potential to become a regulatory superpower, with a hedging approach. As Nikhil Pahwa, the founder of Medianama, points out , Google may go to the Indian courts to challenge CCI’s order, due to hefty restrictions on their business model and practices by the regulator. As the tweet quoted above explains, enabling more security and fragmenting Google’s power to control the ecosystem may be a reasonable move. However, the cross-compatibility of applications can only be dealt by data and tech-related regulatory solutions. The lack of compliance among technology companies however has to be dealt with a comprehensive outlook which may solve the multi-sector implications of the companies’ presence, with time. Additionally, Google does not support the proposition of having a self-regulatory body, according to Reuters, which Facebook India had suggested. Perhaps, decoupling is not the approach that competition regulators adopt. Blending domestic regulations and public policy choices that governments make, in the case of digital technologies, would create sustainable information economies and chains. Some Updates Recently, Google was suppose to impose 15-30% commission on in-app sales on Play Store, while denying app developers the choice to opt for other payment gateways in India. Another penalty of approx. 933 cr INR has been imposed by CCI. This is a landmark development. Deadline for implementation of this billing policy was set on October 31, 2022. In addition, a new order has been published by CCI stating Google's GPBS to be anti-competitive. Point 9.2 in the order is clearly landmark in virtue and action. The assessment explains the Commission's conclusions: Point 9.2 in the measures explains a critical action Google is required to do, which will hurt them deeply: Google shall not impose any Anti-steering Provisions on app developers and shall not restrict them from communicating with their users to promote their apps and offerings, in any manner. If we look these measures consecutively, we can say that the approach taken by CCI is quite competent and will have major implications ahead for good.

Digital Technologies have transformed supply and information chains for businesses around the globe. For instance, artificial intelligence (AI) as a technology has permeated every sphere of commercial business activities ranging from chatbots, voice recognition, and facial recognition. The general concerns of privacy, data breaches, and specific concerns of bias and data profiling can ensure a large number of disputes. Therefore, the importance of ADR methods to address such issues with expert technical knowledge and understanding the know-how of technology is very important. Regardless of this specific technical expertise, it is important for dispute resolution professionals and arbitrators to identify some potential issues in any technology disputes. In this article, the trends related to dispute resolution mechanisms on issues surrounding artificial intelligence and other digital technologies have been discussed. Current Means of ADR on Issues Related to Digital Technologies Generally, the stakeholders who are involved in mechanisms of dispute resolution i.e., the arbitrators, negotiators, mediators, and other dispute resolution professionals will often have to deal with the intermeshed questions of law and technology to identify the party responsible for the actions committed by any AI product or services. In order to counter the common issues arising from dispute resolution mechanisms such as costs, time frame, and jurisdictional issues it could be a way to adhere to model clauses for dispute resolution. Procedural rules from various jurisdictions can be combined to create uniform rules for technology arbitration, negotiation, and mediation at a global level. These procedural rules and guidelines will confirm a time frame for the resolution of a dispute and will resolve basic jurisdictional challenges and promote an efficient dispute resolution system. The substantive and procedural laws are already prefixed by the parties in the contracts. This will also ensure that jurisdiction is conferred to a specific place. These model clauses and procedural guidelines will assist parties involved in the dispute as well as the dispute resolution professionals to adjudicate upon the developing areas of technology-related questions instead of diverting focus on extant conflict of law issues arising in dispute resolution. For a more consumer-focused dispute resolution, the guidelines should be domestically oriented depending on the place where the company operates within the country or where the consumer resides (in personam jurisdiction) or a more convenient forum (Forum conveniens). The various methods of Dispute resolution to deal with Technology related disputes would include the following as described. Technology Arbitration Technology-related arbitration has grown from typical commercial contracts and agreements to include a wide array of claims pertaining to consumer, IPR, and competition law issues. Lawsuits arising from the liability of the semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles, for example, can also be addressed via arbitration. The complexities arise in identifying the parties responsible for the malfeasance. It can include the owner of the system/technology, the developers and the engineers or the company manufacturing the AI products and services. The essential feature of technology-related arbitration is to ensure that a neutral place for dispute resolution is chosen. For example, since it involves questions that would require technical expertise, especially on privacy concerns surrounding the AI system due to an error in the code of the system, it can be dealt with by neutral experts that have specialized knowledge and experience to assist the arbitrators in the decision-making process. Since Arbitration is relatively a flexible process where the parties can lay out their own procedure, costs are shared and specialized expert opinion can be provided in complex artificial intelligence disputes. External Dispute Resolution (EDR) This is a widespread practice for ensuring accountability and an oversight mechanism, for example, in the case of Australian Financial Complaints. This mechanism of dispute resolution can also be utilized for any consumer-related issues arising from technologies such as privacy concerns, compensation for any tort committed, etc. For instance, if an AI service or product has mishandled personal information or caused damage to the consumer, then an EDR scheme can be proposed to handle specific consumer complaints. Complaints can be made by Consumers for which EDR will ensure that the companies and businesses can respond within a specific time and accede to the request of the consumers. If no satisfactory response is received by the consumer, then in accordance with the policies, guidelines and recommendations, further examination of the consumer complaint will be taken up by the independent persons in EDR. Upon a fair and reasonable assessment, negotiation will be conducted between the consumers and the businesses for reaching an agreement on the amount of compensation. Expert determination Expert determination can take place if there is a pre-existing expert determination clause in the contract between the parties. A dispute can be referred to as expert determination where the submission can be made by parties. An expert can be selected by the parties unanimously and can be someone with technical knowledge and expertise to determine the various technical facets of the dispute. The decision of the expert would be binding on the parties. The expert determination as a dispute resolution mechanism can be used alongside an existing arbitration or mediation case. It can be used for IPR-related claims arising from the dispute. The clauses governing expert determination in the contract would establish the jurisdiction hence removing the issues associated with jurisdiction. Unlike arbitration, where an expert would be appointed at a later stage by the Arbitrator, expert determination appoints an expert to decide the entirety of the dispute[1]. The usual problem with technology-related arbitration is the appointment of technical experts from both the sides to adduce evidence, each providing their expertise on the dispute at hand. The question at hand remains with the arbitrator to choose which expert evidence to be preferred and this major question is left to be decided by the arbitrators. These issues with technology-related arbitration have encouraged parties to appoint a neutral technical expert themselves for analysing the entire dispute and are the decision makers of the dispute. This usually involves the appointment of a neutral technical expert by the parties through an agreement. In a usual case, if the parties cannot agree on a neutral expert, then an industry expert will be appointed. In the case of AI-related disputes, a neutral technical expert can be appointed by a proposed Law and Technology body, whose details have been provided at a later section in this article. For instance, if there is an AI-related dispute concerning the manufacturing of the AI product and the parties involved are the company’s developer of the AI software and the manufacturing company, then a neutral technical expert can be appointed in accordance with the agreement entered into between the company and the manufacturers to decide the dispute instead of appointment of an arbitrator. The decision of the expert will be non-binding or binding, at the option of the parties to the agreement. However, parties should seek some guidance while drafting the expert determination clause to reflect accurately and layout exhaustively the scope of disputes that are submitted to experts for decision making. More often than not, when there are a large scope of disputes and defaults arising from AI-related technology services, disputes can be split between technology arbitration, meditation-negotiation and expert determination depending upon the parties involved, cost-effectiveness, and nature of the dispute. Expedited Arbitration As the name suggests, it is an arbitration method used in WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation) as a dispute resolution mechanism that is carried out in a short span of time by eliminating costs and adhering to strict time limits in each stage of the Arbitration. WIPO has proposed the Expedited Arbitration Rules (2021) consisting of a set of procedural rules that parties can follow for any arbitration arising out of commercial disputes between parties. A sole arbitrator is nominated by the parties for the appointment. Further, the non-common usage of ADR for technology firms was noticed at an international level when a working group of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) explored the legal implications of dispute resolution in a digital economy. This is mostly because the tech sector has characteristic claims involving technical and specialized questions and demands a highly flexible mechanism to overcome the innovations of the emerging technology. Further draft provisions for technology-related dispute resolution has defined a technology dispute to mean a “dispute arising out of or relating to supply, procurement, research, development, implementation, licensing, commercialization, distribution, and financing”[2]. The draft had discussed several issues as to why technological disputes have not preferred ADR mechanism by addressing questions of time frame (Draft Provision 4) and case management conferences (Draft Provision 3). In case management conferences, the arbitral tribunal will often discuss procedural questions of how arbitration proceedings will be conducted and technology experts can be decided beforehand. This will ensure that any future ambiguities and further procedural difficulties will not arise at a crucial point of dispute resolution. The proceedings are structured during the case management and handling expert evidence is discussed so as to prevent further complexities from arising in the future. However, the draft rules have not specified whether the provisions and procedural framework are sufficient for the large scope of technology disputes. Proposing a Law and Technology Body Other additional concerns that have not been dealt with are questions of jurisdiction, costs, enforceability and bargaining power of the parties in disputes are also some of the common concerns surrounding technological disputes especially for consumers of such technologies. Engineers and experts from the field of AI and other digital technologies should closely work with dispute resolution centres in the country to render expert advice and provide a qualified technical knowledge upon the subject of fixing liability on the companies, developers and manufacturers. Subsequently, the establishment of a Law and Technology body consisting of various stakeholders including developers, engineers and lawyers could be made possible in various countries to tackle issues relating to emerging technology innovations and legal issues surrounding the same. Dispute resolution professionals can closely work with the body to estimate the most effective dispute resolution mechanism to be deployed while dealing with emerging technology law questions[3]. Conclusion on Law 2.0 and Challenges Ahead AI and its profound impact on society can raise the question of how such an emergent technology should be regulated and the regulatory challenges surrounding it. The rapid pace at which development in AI is heading presents the modern government-enacted system of regulation (Law 2.0) with a series of challenges that the static regulations cannot address. Dispute resolution and cooperation between different government entities and the introduction of new regulatory authorities are very important at this stage. The response time to implement the following changes within the government-enacted regulatory regime would outpace the technological changes made within the field of AI. Therefore, a policy-based approach estimating the soft law implications of the phenomena can be used to counteract a wide range of challenges posed by the legal technology industry. Dispute resolution professionals can rely on the policies and guidelines that are focused on dealing with characteristic issues of privacy, data breaches, confidentiality, and IPR claims. This would ensure that the future of dispute resolution would be expeditious without having to rely on court decisions and precedents[4]. This is significant to mention as rapid changing requirements of tech dispute resolution, rigid systems of lawsuits, and relying on precedents to deal with tech disputes may be futile for an industry concerning AI and technology disputes that has evolving changes. They can be systematically addressed by new and developing institutions that evolve with the changing requirements of technology, innovation, and industry. The unique feature of technology disputes poses a challenging landscape for dispute resolution due to shortened product life cycles and innovations within the field. In the competitive environment of technology companies and services, dispute resolution professionals should be equipped and empowered to deal with the specialized requirements of technology disputes. Significant issues of jurisdiction and short timelines for dispute resolution can lay out an optimistic future for tech dispute resolution. Arrangements at both global and domestic levels should be systematically focused upon for maintaining standardized dispute resolution mechanisms and qualified dispute resolution professionals to handle high-technology disputes. Information sharing about mechanisms of dispute resolution deployed for specific tech disputes should be promoted between countries. Further Readings [1] The Arbitrator and Mediator; (2013) 32(2); ISSN 1446-0548 [2] United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II (Dispute Settlement). [3] Arbitration Tech Toolbox: Technology- Related Dispute Resolution: Tailored Rules at UNCITRAL; Raoul J. Renard; July 14,2022 [4] How to Improve technical expertise for judges in AI related Litigation- Melissa Whitney; November 7, 2019

This article is co-authored by Poulomi Chatterjee. In a recent article on Law 3.0 and Soft Law, it is explained what Soft Law has been, in conceptual terms, and how does it shape our legal decisions and policy actions. In this article, as a follow up to the concept of Soft Law, we take the example of the policy construct of the Indo-Pacific, to examine the concept as a driver of soft law tendencies, in India and the rest of Asia. The coverage of the concept of Indo-Pacific is widely pan-Asia, since governments across the world including the United States, India, Japan & Australia and regional organisations such as the European Union embrace the importance of this concept. It does have important ramifications in various fields of law, including international law, law & digital technologies, environmental law and corporate governance & ethics. A Quick Recap to Soft Law Soft Law is a concept, mostly seen in the realm of international law, where we see emerging trends of hortatory (or pedagogic) measures, rules, systems, regulations and even norms, whose point of origin is not a system or authority of law (which is usually a top-down authority), but a set of stakeholder entities, institutions, groups and individuals, who have a genuine and legitimate role to play. They might not have the role to become an equal stakeholder to address or even acknowledge a question of law. However, their contributions, interventions and approaches to realities bound by legal systems and frameworks are essential, since they may or may not be put into use by Governments and International Organisations across the world to justify their actions and public policy measures. In many ways, the role of Soft Law is clearly visible in fields like international commercial arbitration, environmental law, international space law and technology law, for starters. Here is an excerpt from the 2018 Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law (with Commentaries) produced by the UN International Law Commission, A/73/10, Part 5: Various materials other than primary evidence of alleged instances of practice accepted as law (accompanied by opinio juris) may be consulted in the process of determining the existence and content of rules of customary international law. These commonly include written texts bearing on legal matters, in particular treaties, resolutions of international organizations and intergovernmental conferences, judicial decisions (of both international and national courts), and scholarly works. Such texts may assist in collecting, synthesizing or interpreting practice relevant to the identification of customary international law, and may offer precise formulations to frame and guide an inquiry into its two constituent elements. Part Five seeks to explain the potential significance of these materials, making clear that it is of critical importance to study carefully both the content of such materials and the context within which they were prepared. Another excerpt states the following, from Part 5, i.e., Conclusion 14 states clearly that the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists may serve as subsidiary means: The Commentaries also state two important aspects of development of legal principles and concepts. The first aspect of the development of law, has been described in this excerpt: There is need for caution when drawing upon writings, since their value for determining the existence of a rule of customary international law varies: this is reflected in the words “may serve as”. First, writers sometimes seek not merely to record the state of the law as it is (lex lata) but to advocate its development (lex ferenda). In doing so, they do not always distinguish (or distinguish clearly) between the law as it is and the law as they would like it to be. Second, writings may reflect the national or other individual viewpoints of their authors. Third, they differ greatly in quality. The second aspect on the subsidiary means, especially on the role of publicists has been aptly described: The term “publicists”, which comes from the Statute of the International Court of Justice, covers all those whose writings may elucidate questions of international law. While most such writers will, in the nature of things, be specialists in public international law, others are not excluded. The reference to “the most highly qualified” publicists emphasizes that attention ought to be paid to the writings of those who are eminent in the field. In the final analysis, however, it is the quality of the particular writing that matters rather than the reputation of the author; among the factors to be considered in this regard are the approach adopted by the author to the identification of customary international law and the extent to which his or her text remains loyal to it. The reference to publicists “of the various nations” highlights the importance of having regard, so far as possible, to writings representative of the principal legal systems and regions of the world and in various languages when identifying customary international law. The excerpts clearly give a pathway to governments and international organisations to promote soft law measures in the development of law per se. It thereby makes obvious that one of the most interesting features of soft law is that it can never be a static way of unnerving legal measures. As stated in the article on Law 3.0 and Soft Law, the excerpt provided explains the dynamic nature of Soft Law: It is a phenomenon where the repositories of legal thinking can always learn the best from the policy phenomenon, which are uncertain, unclear and hortatory. Lawmakers and courts can try to make Soft Law rigid, but the nuance always lies in the details. It is impossible to keep up with the rigidity, as Soft Law has to be fungible. Otherwise, the instrumentation which we call as “the” Soft Law, will automatically become a relic or existing part of the Hard Law conundrum, in the form of regulation mechanisms, laws, judgments or any other possible form. The following excerpt from Soft Law in Outer Space [Irmgard Marboe (Ed.)] (2012) may be treated as a reminder to the practitioners of international law, on the dynamic nature of Soft Law: On the other hand, as public international lawyers, we need to be careful not to read too much into such instruments when it is not appropriate. Just like, under the law of treaties, it is not permissible, in the absence of ambiguity in the terms of a particular treaty provision, to ‘read into’ that provision rules to reflect what should be, it is not appropriate to convert in our mind something that is not, and not intended to be such, into a binding rule or obligation. This need for caution sometimes goes against our instincts as academic international lawyers, given that we operate in a field of law where normative rules are distilled from descriptive behaviour, such as in the formulation of customary international law. A diagram from the previous article on Law 3.0 and Soft Law has been provided for reference: The Language of Indo-Pacific and its Relevance The Indo-Pacific region, as we know, is a concept promoted in the field of international relations and Asia studies, where the importance of two ocean regions, Indian Ocean Region and the Pacific Ocean Region is attached to the concept of a rules-based international order. A geographical depiction in From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance, Implementation and Challenges of the Indo-Pacific region as understood by different countries in Asia has been provided for reference: Now, the concept has earned its value since the early 2000s, when the Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had promoted the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. We see that in the year 2017, a minilateral grouping known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the Quad), consisting India, the US, Australia and Japan, is reinstated, and the level of diplomatic engagement has improved from the level of Foreign Secretaries to Foreign Ministers and Heads of States (and Governments). As the conflict in Ukraine unfolds, in February 2022, a Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was conducted in Melbourne. The objectives of the Quad, have been explained by the White House Statement on the grouping: Today, we pledge to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, combat climate change, and address shared challenges, including in cyber space, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief as well as maritime domains. Meanwhile another group of 4 nations have come up to form a minilateral grouping, where the region of focus is West Asia, known as I2U2, with India and the US joined by the United Arab Emirates and Israel. The recent I2U2 Leaders’ Virtual Summit was conducted in July 2022. In the Press Release by the Government of India, the objectives of I2U2 have been provided in brief: ​I2U2 is aimed to encourage joint investments in six mutually identified areas such as water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. It intends to mobilize private sector capital and expertise to help modernize the infrastructure, low carbon development pathways for our industries, improve public health, and promote the development of critical emerging and green technologies. Now, there is a political overtone to the concept of the Indo-Pacific, which these 2 important groupings would reflect with time (for example, criticising actions or decisions of other countries). Yet, India as an actor in the Indo-Pacific, with and beyond these groupings, despite its own state interests, has shown to become an international actor with concerns beyond the overtones, which even has been reflective in its international law jurisprudence for years, which has its own limited criticisms. An article on India’s approach to international law has been provided for reading. The importance of the concept of Indo-Pacific, in the field of jurisprudence, and not just international law, lies in the details of the understanding of value systems and policy thinking which this concept promotes in Asia. Earlier, the concept of international law, in the post-Cold War times had the indulgence of the Asia-Pacific understanding, which was oriented around the policy visions and value systems promoted by members of the regional organisation, ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations), Japan, the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China. After 2020, the concept of the Indo-Pacific has become relevant for India, not just for its sovereign interests, but also to facilitate innovation in policy thinking, which directly links to India’s own challenges of developmental economy, sustainable development, legal innovation and many important areas of concern. Areas of security and counter-terrorism also come within the scope of international humanitarian law, and India’s contribution to that jurisprudence, has been impressive. Hence, just because the concept has relevant political overtones, it would be premature to discount the policy groupthink that the Indo-Pacific as a regional construct offers. For example, many significant developments in the field of international law and even policy matters of global concern, have been promoted by international cities. Here is a list of some important conferences, which relate to the information age and how international law has been embraced, starting from diplomatic cooperation to collective and several policy actions: World Summit on the Information Society (Geneva, 2003; Tunis, 2005;) World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) (Dubai, 2012) International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Education, Planning Education in the AI Era: Lead the Leap (Beijing, 2019) World Trade Organisation 12th Ministerial Conference (Geneva, 2022) The significance of international cities is not limited to mere political presence. They act as locations of strategic importance and have an important role in shaping policy impact at governmental and intergovernmental levels. It is therefore necessary to understand the value and purpose of the Indo-Pacific concept in that regard. The language of Indo-Pacific as a regional construct explains how the concept may drive soft law in India’s own legal and regulatory affairs with time: Shaping India’s Knowledge and Information Economics Shaping India as a neutral and reliable forum to promote traditional, modern and diverse means of alternate dispute resolution Shaping newer legal, technological & economic solutions on sustainable development, taking the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” into due consideration Shaping India as the hub of digital innovation and mobility for governments, researchers and businesses Now, these these aspects of influence may be related to India’s domestic interests, but the impact it could have would be global. India certainly has the potential to shape the regulatory standards pursued by governments and intergovernmental bodies across the globe, which is not limited to the Government of India, and its positions. Thus, the minilateral groupings in their objectives are trying to show what aspects of development and security are they are interested to take up to promote prosperity and global stability. Indo-Pacific Approaches to Shape International Law The formation of several minilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific region has several implications on the field of International Law, especially in regards to trade. Quoting Mr. Abe’s idea of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), ever since its recognition, the Indo-Pacific region has been looking forward to a rules-based international order, aside from the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful settlement of disputes, and most importantly, the promotion of free trade. However, all of these terminologies mentioned, are based on the positivist understanding of international law and even domestic laws, in most Asian countries (for example, India). The development of law (lex feranda) at regional and global levels, are not guided merely by the principles and questions of law, but also by those policy understandings that build the foundation of the same. Let us take the examples of China and the United States, whose importance in shaping up the “rules-based international order” after the 1990s has been significant. Lessons from Beijing To quote a recent example stating why the Indo-Pacific as a construct is of essential value, is to assess the scope of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI is Asia’s biggest supply chain initiative launched by the Chinese Government in order to reap the maximum trade benefits from all across the region. One of the main aims of China through this initiative is to connect the continent of Asia with that of Europe and Africa by way of land as well as maritime networks, to simply improve the regional integration and increase trade between these areas, China benefiting the most from it, while also stimulating tremendous economic growth. Moreover, it is also contended that since the People’s Republic of China is heavily dependent upon the mechanism of trade, it being the largest manufacturing country as well as an exporter of goods of high demand; it is also heavily dependent on the routes provided by the Indian Ocean Region, which translates the purpose of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) acting in favour of the country. Lessons from Washington DC After the 2000s, the role of the United States in shaping public policy and avenues of governance has shaped drastically. We see that after the 2008 crisis in West Asia and North Africa, the role of the US Government in shaping public policy and self-regulatory approaches to governance, in various countries, has been subject to decline. Now, in the information age, we anticipate the role of various entities, such as FAAMG companies (big technology companies), which even institutions like the European Commission are concerned about. After the UN Security Council-led actions in Libya, the United States Foreign Policy has been subject to actions, which ally their own domestic concerns. Their role in shaping public international law has been already taken over by a huge diversification of European, Chinese, Indian, African and even Latin American scholarships. The United States had pledged to support efforts to combat climate change. However, even after the accession of the Paris Accords, it has not achieved the required commitments. Nevertheless, the US and the EU are supporting climate efforts in India, in cooperation with the Government of India, which surely can shape incremental changes in creating and maintaining regulatory standards in law and environment in Asia, as the United States attempts to create its presence in Asia again. Now, it is important to realise that various state actors, in the history of international law, have shaped the development of law in various domains constantly. For example, the advent of international technology law has to be connected with the development of international telecommunication law and international IP law. Even the USSR and the United States despite many disagreements over the codification of international space law treaties, had invested in the nuances and sophisticated features of the scholarship involving the pertinent legal questions. In general, many documents such as proposals, draft resolutions, communiques, statements and policy prescriptions are legally not binding. They still exist because they are useful in doing 2 things: Tracing out the origins and phases of development of the legal and policy questions for consideration Improving their trajectory of action, omission and review (especially in the case of justifying state practices/an international legal custom, for example) When we look at the Indo-Pacific, we learn from the US and China that their policy visions do represent a dichotomy of visions which remain congruent, hostile or divergent. The trade conflict between the US and Chinese Governments in 2018 also reflects the same phenomenon, which may remind us the ramifications of the Brexit negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom on the world economy, since 2017. Another example that could be taken would be the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had a serious impact on the Russian economy as well as the economies of various non-aligned countries, including India. This can be effectively related to a statement by India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar, whose excerpt is provided as follows: Connectivity, now encompasses data and energy flows not just unhindered movement of goods and people. Data, digitization and technology are redefining and reshaping almost every aspect of business and society. India and ASEAN contribute to the ongoing rebalancing of the global order. We are driven by a rising consumer class, a strong start-up ecosystem, a growing internet economy and a robust demographic dividend. We have also between us the necessary trust and transparency now so central to digital cooperation. The Approaches and their Impact India’s jurisprudential approach to adapt with international legal instruments or norms directly or indirectly, has been tumultuous due to many reasons. Some of the general reasons include the inconsistency of state practices or the judiciary’s inconsistency to settle on some first principles of understanding on issues of general international law. An excerpt from an article published by the Indian Express explains the phenomenon in the case of the Supreme Court of India: Several facets of this judiciary-led transition from dualism to monism require elucidation. First, the apex court incorporating CIL as part of the domestic legal regime is consistent with the practice of other common law countries. However, the sticky part is the ease with which CIL is accepted as part of Indian law. For instance, the Supreme Court’s willingness to readily accept the precautionary principle as part of CIL flies in the face of international law debates where the acceptance of this principle as a customary norm remains contested. Determination of whether a particular provision indeed constitutes a binding customary norm under international law requires the double requirement of state practice (the actual practice of the states) and opinio juris (belief that the custom is part of the law). The apex court rarely conducts such an analysis. Even the recommendations by the Law Commission of India do not stand out. Some tribunals have had this problem of delivering inconsistent judgments, which on principle and purpose, have been unclear. Now, here are some instances where adapting with the concept of the Indo-Pacific as an India-centric platform of innovation in public policy, creates tendencies for incursion of soft law approaches in and through the Indian constitutional and administrative framework: Shaping the role and practical essence of regulators in the fields of data & technology governance, competition law, ESG, international investments, trade and legal reforms Shaping the legal and economic outlook of India’s regulators, judicial system, dispute resolution mechanisms and relevant stakeholders from the private sector, to cooperate between self-regulated practices and regulatory compliances Globalising the experience of constraints and mobility in creating policy impact and then shaping the legal approaches to solving the problems related to the same In further articles, the role of soft law in other relevant international law fields, such as of outer space, technology, IP, environment and others could be discussed.

In this article, I have discussed the idea of a Pseudonymous Economy in the digital world, and its role in affecting human digital privacy. The idea is ever-evolving, and it would become intriguing to estimate its scope and reach. The concept of a Pseudonymous Economy was first coined by the angel investor and entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan. In his own words, he defined the Pseudonymous Economy as the following in an article for The Hub: Visual Legal Analytica is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Subscribed “The Pseudonymous Economy is the foundation for muscular classical liberalism that is capable of standing up in today’s information environment. Rather than make naive appeals to people to look past gender or race, or to not cancel or to not discriminate online, instead we make it impossible to do that by taking away that information entirely with realistic avatars and fully functional pseudonyms.” Thus, the Pseudonymous Economy builds the foundation of an ideal world, wherein it becomes impossible to discriminate against an individual’s identity, be it any, or any other factor that may be used to discriminate amongst individuals, due to the existence of pseudonyms and avatars that people may use to interact with each other without being face to face and keeping a segment of their identity private to their own selves. In a legal sense, the Pseudonymous Economy brings another layer of personal privacy to an individual’s enjoyment of life. Thus, as the Right to Privacy was recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India of 1949, it could be a fore coming case wherein the Right to Pseudonymity could be recognised from an operative angle. Photo by 8machine _ on Unsplash Some Thoughts on the Indian Case of Privacy Right(s) Privacy has been a continuously evolving concept, which has started to overlap uncomfortably between several facets of human lives, but mainly in regards to identity and autonomy. Hence, the two terms have been quite scrutinised, quite closely by learned scholars in order to construct definitive understandings around the idea of ‘privacy’ amongst identity and autonomy, let us separate the term ‘privacy’ into various broad categories, especially information privacy, and decisional privacy. Information Privacy refers to an individual’s autonomous right to control the ability of strangers on the Internet to disseminate, gain, or use such information about themselves. In furtherance to this, Decisional Privacy, on the other hand, refers to the right to make decisions regarding family, intimate relations, and other private affairs. It is interestingly observed that the current Indian jurisprudence has only been able to recognise ‘Decisional Privacy’ as a fundamental right. The Right to Information Privacy might just be coming around. The Concept and its Dimensions Balaji, under the concept of a Pseudonymous Economy, creates a vast distinction between three terms - pseudonymity, anonymity, and reality. He went on to state the following: 1. The Pseudonym is used on sites like Reddit and Twitter 2. The Anonym is used on sites like 4chan that are designed to be anonymous 3. The Real name is used on platforms like Facebook As he went ahead to state the essential characteristics that a Pseudonymous Economy possesses, it became clear that such a concept has lively reflections worldwide. His contribution, interestingly, has paved way to refine the construct which has emerged as a phenomenon in the cyberspace. With this, he elaborates the following: 1. The phenomenon/concept is already mainstream, i.e., the basic idea is already pervasive both online (usernames) and offline (nicknames and changed names) 2. It is where the society is heading towards 3. It is not anonymity 4. It is essential to decentralization 5. It is a continuum, having degrees of pseudonymity This can be understood by seeing and observing threads and comments on microblogging and ecosystem platforms, where it becomes apparent that (for example, Twitter and Instagram), where people quarrel on trivial issues. Even if the issue is contentious, they are increasingly, due to the reach they need to converse, or the mental effect of the discourse on the platforms, or any other reasons as may persist, being reactionary in engagements. Even on LinkedIn we see similar trends, where hyped or polarised content triumphs over nuanced takes on professional, personal and business affairs. Start-ups and even some blockchain platforms, also for example are subjected to banter and ranting, via coordinated marketing campaigns, which is nothing new in the business world. The new thing which is observant is the sophisticated tendency and dissimulation of the algorithms, which drive such discourse. Yet, human bias and algorithmic bias, have to be always taken into proportionate consideration. Freedom After Speech? As a solution to the whole scenario, Balaji Srinivasan’s conception of a Pseudonymous Economy in the digital world could remain (and even become) escalating into the state of human anonymity or pseudonymity as the baseline to promote protected communication, engagement and discourse in and via digital platforms. To be more specific, a Pseudonymous Economy grants one the right of ‘Freedom After Speech.’ This means that a real person who is casually operating under a pseudonym can feel free to share their own opinions without having any apprehension of fear to his/her reputation, in regards to their real identity. In a similar way, the social media “groups” will not be able to trace such person back and threaten the safety of the individual who is using a part of technology belong to a Pseudonymous Economy. Let us remind ourselves of the proposition kept by Prof. Daniel Solvoe in his book, ‘The Digital Person,’ in which he summarises various kinds of methods that are being used to collect personal information online and how it puts the targeted individual at risk. Thus, it is safe to say that when a person operates under a pseudonym, the person is partially safe from being identified and tracked down, which reduces the chances of online stalking and retrieving confidential information that is private to you. However, when one operates while giving disclosure to their real name (original identity), it becomes easy to identify as well as tracking the person down. An example of this may be through the use of LinkedIn, the networking platform which uses real names, rather than pseudonyms. Additionally, it must also be mentioned that such techniques for pushing back against these invasive actions by way of a Pseudonymous Economy, i.e., another type of technique for ensuring electronic anonymity may be seen as direct responses to institutional digital surveillance, as was also noted by, Diana Saco, the author of Cybering Democracy. An example of this type of pseudonymity may be Satoshi Nakamoto or Corpse Husband, whom we know are real personalities, but behind pseudonyms who consistently maintain a certain kind of anonymity, along with reputation. This is because although a real person may be operating under a username in Twitter or Instagram, but the same usernames also hold reputation if being used for a prolonged period of time. Understanding the Administrative and Regulatory Dilemmas However, an essential factor of concern that has been missed in the instant mix of scenarios is the regulation of pseudonymity in case users become reactionary in groups or severally. The world is not unknown to the effect of issues-based laws not codified and regulations not developed anyways. Nevertheless, it is appropriate that even those settled norms, laws, regulations and principles, which exist in a realtime scenario, must be treated in a clinical fashion to generate better jurisprudence via courts, or via parliamentary committee briefings, to see how various stakeholders address and approach emerging legal questions. Considering Prof. Roger Brownsword’s book Law 3.0, and his views on a regulatory in the information age, it is obvious to discern that no institution (public, private) is a monolith. Still, let us assume that we should try achieving a Pseudonymous Economy via a set of laws and regulations, generating the Degrees of Pseudonymity would become the first obvious dilemma. Under this concept, it is understood that an individual cannot attain “air-tight” protection in favour of their real personality. Thus, the individual can attain some pseudonymity in some proportions, in certain dimensions of reference points (financial, governmental, economic, business, academic, etc.,) as well as in the avatars formed under a Pseudonymous Economy. This could help governments we can then track the actual person who may be responsible for the interventions. To understand this better, we must also look at the concept of the 33 Bits, which reportedly assists you in measuring the degree of pseudonymity. There are approximately seven and a half billion people on the planet, and two to the 33rd power is approximately eight billion. So, with just 33 bits of information, you can completely de-anonymize someone and track them down. In the same context, if you have ten bits of information about someone, they are inside a set of two to the tenth, or approximately a thousand people. Similarly, if you have 20 bits, that is approximately two to the twentieth – or approximately a million people. This example in some way shows that pseudonymity exists on a mere scale inside the 33 Bit range. Such Degrees of Pseudonymity, however, remain to be a varying choice to persons known to the Pseudonymous Economy. This means that there exists no concrete form of law in regards to the appropriate Degrees of Pseudonymity and the safety factor while operating under a Pseudonymous Economy. Additionally, however, as the Pseudonymous Economy is slowly legitimized after discussions like such and constant endeavours to address such challenges, it will have to be advocated properly by introducing laws which recognise some kind of safety measures. It could however, be related with the phenomenon of Soft Law (Law 3.0) as well. Maybe, we should ponder upon the questions as to how we understand human digital privacy in parallelism to human digital privity. Further Readings Diana Saco, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet 119 (University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 2002) Daniel J. Solvoe, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 23 (New York University Press, New York, 2006). Ken D. Kumayama, “A Right to Pseudonymity” 51 Arizona Law Review 427 (2009).

A 2-year project meets its meaningful conclusion. The ISAIL team declares that the follow-up to the 2020 Handbook on AI and International Law - the 2021 Handbook on AI and International Law is hereby published. The handbook graces the forewords contributed by Gregor Strojin & Ish Jain, FCIARb, FHKIArb, FMIArb, SFBiam, FPD, FAIADR, which has been edited by Abhivardhan, Aditi Sharma, Manohar Samal ACIArb and Mridutpal Bhattacharyya with the help of 19 contributors.

An amazing session comes to an end. I would like to extend my gratitude to His Excellency Benoit Sauveroche, Jared Jaskot and Sanjay Notani for releasing the 2020 Handbook on AI and International Law with a foreword by Mr Eugenio V Garcia. Mr Benoit was pleased to discuss about the role of AI in Indo-EU cooperation. We also thank our editors SUMAN KALANI, Kshitij Naik and Akash Manwani & our contributors Manohar Samal, Dev Tejnani, Sameer Samal, Aditi Sharma, Sanad Arora and many more for contributing to this wonderful work which is on 20+ fields of international law. You can read the book at https://lnkd.in/eW3yKzC You can watch the inaugural at https://lnkd.in/eSwjNhx