
The author, Dr Cristina Vanberghen is a Senior Expert, European Commission and a Distinguished Expert at the Advisory Council of the Indian Society of Artificial Intelligence and Law.
Artificial Intelligence is defining a new international order. Cyberspace is reshaping the geopolitical map and the global balance of power. Europe, coming late to the game, is struggling to achieve strategic sovereignty in an interconnected world characterized by growing competition and conflicts between States. Do not think that cyberspace is an abstract concept. It has a very solid architecture composed of infrastructure (submarine and terrestrial cable, satellites, data centers etc), a software infrastructure (information systems and programs, languages and protocols allowing data transfer and communication between the Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), and a cognitive infrastructure which includes massive exchange of data, content, exchanges of information beyond classic “humint”.
Cyberspace is the fifth dimension: an emerging geopolitical space which complements land, sea, air and space, a dimension undergoing rapid militarization and in consequence deepening the divide between distinct ideological blocs at the international level. In this conundrum, the use and misuse of data – transparency, invisibility, manipulation, deletion – has become a new form of geopolitical power, and increasingly a weapon of war. The use of data is shifting the gravitational center of geopolitical power.
This geopolitical reordering is taking place not only between states but also between technological giants and States. The Westphalian confidence in the nation state is being eroded by the dominance of these giants which are oblivious to national borders, and which develop technology too quickly for states to understand, let alone regulate. What we are starting to experience is practically an invisible war characterized by data theft, manipulation or suppression, where the chaotic nature of cyberspace leads to a mobilization of nationalism, and where cyberweapons - now part of the military arsenal of countries such as China, Israel, Iran, South Korea, the United States and Russia – increases the unpredictability of political decision-making power. The absence of common standards means undefined risks, leading to a level of international disorder with new borders across which the free flow of information cannot be guaranteed. There is a risk of fragmentation of networks based on the same protocols as the Internet but where the information that circulates is now confined to what government or the big tech companies allow you to see.
Whither Europe in this international landscape?
The new instruments for geopolitical dominance in today’s world are AI, 5 or 6G, quantum, semiconductors, biotechnology, and green energy. Technology investment is increasingly based on the need to encounter Chinese investment. In August 2022, President Joe Biden signed the Chips and Science Act granting 280 billion US$ to the American Tech industry, with 52.7 billion US$ being devoted to semiconductors. Europe is hardly following suit. European technological trends do not reflect a very optimistic view of its technological influence and power in the future. With regard to R&D invested specifically in Tech, the share of European countries’ investments, relative to total global R&D in Tech, has been declining rapidly for 15 years. Germany went from 8% to 2%; France from 6% to 2%. The European Union invests five times less in private R&D in Tech than the United States. Starting from ground zero 20 years ago, China has now greatly overtaken Europe and may catch up with the US . The question we face is whether given this virtual arms race, each country will continue to develop its own AI ecosystem with its own (barely visible) borders, or whether mankind can create a globally shared AI space anchored in common rules and assumptions. The jury is out. In the beginning, the World Wide Web was supposed to be an open Internet. But the recent trend has been centrifugal. There are many illustrations of this point: from Russian efforts to build its own Internet network to Open AI threatening to withdraw from Europe; from Meta withdrawing its social networks from Europe due to controversies over user data, to Google building an independent technical infrastructure. This fragmentation advances through a diversity of methods, ranging from content blocking to corporate official declarations.
But could the tide be turning? With the war in Ukraine we have seen a rapid acceleration of use of AI, along with growing competition from the private sector, and this is now triggering more calls for international regulation of AI. And of course, any adherence to a globally accepted regulatory and technological model entails adherence to a specific set of values and interests.
Faced with this anarchic cyberspace, instead of increasing non-interoperability, it will be better to set up a basis for an Internationalized Domain Name (IDN), encompassing also the Arabic, Cyrillic, Hindi, and Chinese languages, and avoiding linguistic silos. Otherwise, we run the clear risk of undermining the globality of the Internet by a sum of national closed networks. And how can we ensure a fair technological revolution? If in the beginning military research was at the origin of technological re